Abstract Serious organised crime groups may enjoy virtual impunity through the corruption and coercion of parties involved in the criminal justice process. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, this is most evident in the intimidation of witnesses and jurors, leading to difficulties in successful prosecution of organised criminality. One notable response to this phenomenon is to hold juryless trials for serious indictable offences, mirroring a similar approach in counter-terrorism legislation arising from the political violence in Northern Ireland. Despite common rationales, such trials have been operationalised differently in these neighbouring jurisdictions: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 'ordinary' legislation was introduced, whereas in Ireland juryless trials are permitted under existing counter-terrorism laws. This article reviews the problematic dimensions of both legislative schemes, and considers their application by the courts since enactment. After outlining viable alternatives, it concludes that juryless trials may be necessary in limited instances, and if so, the English model is to be preferred.
Though it is difficult to determine the extent of intimidation of lay participants in the criminal process, it appears that this phenomenon is not uncommon and has been a grave problem in certain parts of the United Kingdom for decades. 10 Moreover, it appears that four to five trials per year require 24-hour police protection for jurors, 11 though, admittedly, these figures are not recent. There remains a dearth of empirical material on juror coercion and tampering, and when asked questions in Parliament, the Secretary of State for Justice noted that what is now HM Courts & Tribunals Service does not record any data centrally on the number of retrials ordered as a result of jury intimidation. 12 Similarly, no empirical study has been carried out of juror intimidation or coercion in Ireland, but public concern has been heightened by incidents like the discovery of a jury list for a murder trial in a house search in Dublin. 13 Overall, these factors contribute to the receptiveness to the prospect of removing the jury in certain instances, both for the protection of the individuals involved, but also to smooth the operation of the justice process.
Despite common rationales, juryless trials are implemented differently in the United Kingdom and Ireland: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 'ordinary' legislation was introduced to abolish the jury in certain instances for indictable offences, whereas in Ireland juryless trials are permitted under existing counter-terrorism laws. This article reviews the problematic dimensions of both legislative schemes, and considers their application by the courts since enactment. Before analysing the means by which an accused may be tried without a jury, the article next considers the notion of a jury trial and its significance.
The jury trial
In general, the right to a jury trial is regarded as a fundamental element of the adversarial criminal process, and as a norm that should not be interfered with lightly or unduly. The Magna Carta alluded to trial by one's peers, 14 while in Ireland, the jury trial is guaranteed under the Constitution. 15 The significance of this type of trial is manifold. By involving lay peers of the defendant in fact-finding, a representative element comprising the viewpoint and judgment of the community is imported into the justice process. Moreover, the jury trial can comprise an element of participatory democracy, 16 improving community
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THE PROSECUTION OF ORGANISED CRIME knowledge of the process and enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. As De Tocqueville noted, juries 'spread respect for the courts' decisions and for the idea of rights throughout the classes'. 17 Furthermore, the integration of professional and lay decision-making in the criminal trial is viewed as providing a check on the State. This safeguard is important both in substance and in a symbolic sense: the jury may mitigate or overturn over-reaching State powers or biases, and its presence demonstrates the public's potential to hold the State to account.
18
Despite the long-standing convention of jury trials for criminal cases in common law systems, the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not guarantee a right to trial by jury. As the Court of Appeal stated in R v Twomey:
It … does not follow from the hallowed principle of trial by jury that trial by judge alone, when ordered, would be unfair or improperly prejudicial to the defendant ... [F] or the purposes of article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it is irrelevant whether the tribunal is judge and jury or judge alone.
19
In contrast, the right to a jury trial is protected explicitly under the Irish Constitution for all trials on criminal charges, save for three exceptions: trials for minor offences, trials before military tribunals, 20 and trials before a special criminal court.
21

Juryless trials of suspected organised crimes
Despite these significant dimensions of the jury trial, the possibility of holding juryless trials is now well established in England, Wales and Ireland, on the basis of the threats both to juror safety and to the administration of justice. Though such instances are most likely to arise in relation to organised criminality, the English scheme is not limited in this respect: here such a trial is permitted after court order only when specific criteria are satisfied. In Ireland, the usual mode of trial may be circumvented in relation to organised crime in two ways: existing counter-terrorism legislation permits the holding of a juryless trial on the order of 
29
As has been described and analysed previously, 30 juryless trials may be ordered in England, Wales and Northern Ireland where there is evidence of a real and present danger that jury tampering would take place and that despite any reasonable preventative steps there is so substantial a likelihood that tampering would occur as to make it necessary in the interests of justice to hold a juryless trial. 31 In addition, a jury may be discharged during a trial and the trial continued without one, if the judge is satisfied that jury tampering has taken place and that to continue without a jury would be fair to the defendant. 32 Alternatively, the judge may terminate the trial and may order that any new trial must be conducted without a jury.
Prior to enactment, it was stated that this development was prompted by the need to safeguard jurors from organised criminals, 33 and more pragmatically, by the cost of protecting jurors. 34 Despite this political rhetoric, judge-only trials are not limited to cases of organised crime, notwithstanding that systematic and violent coercion is most likely to arise in these instances. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in R v Guthrie rejected the submission that the relevant provisions were intended to be confined to very serious criminal activity and to cases where the tampering involved serious intimidation by professional criminals. 35 Nonetheless, the court noted that the level of criminality and evidence of organised violent crime is more likely to be relevant where the question is whether a trial should start without a jury, than whether an existing trial should continue without one. 36 Thus, it is likely that such applications will often relate to organised crime.
The English model of juryless trials centres on a judicial determination of risk where there is strong evidence that the normal system could not operate properly. There is no category of suspected cases that falls automatically to be heard without a jury; instead the risk of tampering must be established to the satisfaction of the court. This may be due to the fact that the provisions are not focused on one type of crime, but on specific instances of jury tampering. Thus, the focus is on the established risk of intimidation in a particular case, rather than a generic presumption that organised crime cases, say, are likely to involve tampering. Indeed, there is no statutory substantive definition of 'organised crime' or 'criminal organisation' in England and Wales, and there is thus no body of procedural law that applies to organised crime automatically. Instead, evidence must be presented of a real and present danger of jury tampering, and the criminal standard of proof is required, given that the 'right to trial by jury is so deeply entrenched in our constitution'.
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37 Secondly, it must be established that despite any reasonable preventative steps, including police protection, tampering is so likely to occur that the interests of justice necessitate a juryless trial. The Court of Appeal has emphasised that both conditions must be satisfied. 
55
The rationale for removing the jury was and remains juror intimidation and the potential compromising of the resultant decision: the Irish government justified the restoration of the juryless Special Criminal Court (SCC) in 1972 on the basis that juries were likely to be threatened by paramilitaries, 56 and this court continues to be used on the basis that juries in the trial of organised criminals will be subject to threats or intimidation.
57
The 1939 Act allows the DPP to direct the hearing of a trial before the SCC on the basis that she believes the ordinary courts to be inadequate to secure the administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order. 58 As well as this risk-based approach with the DPP as 'gatekeeper', certain crimes fall within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation and are heard without a jury automatically. Both avenues will now be considered.
The certification power of the Irish DPP under existing counter-terrorism legislation permits the denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial for non-scheduled offences. Two matters of concern arise, one of which is procedural, the other more fundamental: first, there is no possibility of review as long as the DPP's decision is bona fide, 59 and secondly, a prosecutor rather than the judiciary holds the ability to limit a constitutional right.
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THE PROSECUTION OF ORGANISED CRIME Ultimately, such a legislative approach is predicated on the view that organised criminality is not 'ordinary' crime and so warrants the adoption of measures used against suspected terrorists. The level of concern is evident in the assertion of a previous Minister for Justice that 'the drug and gun culture … poses as significant a threat to the wellbeing of the Irish State and Irish society as the paramilitaries did at any stage of their campaign for a quarter of a century', 73 and is reiterated in counter-terrorism measures that Irish policy makers looked, rather than to the contemporary scheme in place in neighbouring jurisdictions.
The automatic holding of juryless trials is a crude reaction to the perceived problem of juror intimidation and the fear concerning organised crime in Ireland.
As previously emphasised, no empirical work exists on the extent of this phenomenon, nor on alternatives to wholesale jury abolition. Despite political support for enactment of these powers and for their ongoing retention, not one case has been brought before the SCC under the 2009 Act. 77 This may be a function of the length of time it takes to investigate and construct such cases, and given that a number of people have been charged with organised crime offences, 78 such trials may be heard in future without lay fact-finders.
Problematic dimensions of juryless trials
Certain issues arise regarding the holding of judge-only trials, regardless of whether the decision is based on suspected risk or automatic inclusion of certain offences, and whether prosecutorial or judicial decision is determinative.
Regardless of one's views on the value of the jury trial, 79 it could be argued that the right to equal treatment is threatened when only certain categories of defendant are tried by jury. The right to equality is safeguarded by Article 14 of the ECHR, which precludes discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights. So, rather than constituting a 'free-standing' right as such, it ensures that other rights are not applied in an unequal or discriminatory fashion. Given that there is no right to a jury trial under the ECHR, there cannot be any breach of Article 14 in this context.
In Ireland, the right to equality is protected by The matter of equality has been raised before the Irish courts. In Kavanagh v Ireland, a case concerning the non-scheduled offence of false imprisonment, the Supreme Court held that as the determination of the adequacy of the ordinary courts was political in nature, such a decision should not be regulated in the judicial sphere and so did not engage with the substantive equality argument.
82 Subsequently, the claim that equality was breached was dismissed in Byrne and Dempsey v Government of Ireland. 83 Hamilton J grounded his decision on the fact that the DPP is authorised directly by statute to issue such a certificate and thereby to make a distinction between citizens in this manner. These judgments indicate considerable judicial deference to the legislature due to the perception of an emergency, are resolutely formalistic and fail to engage with the crux of the issue which is the reason for treating differently those accused of and tried for certain crimes in Ireland. 87 However, I suggest that these concerns about equality would be remedied by the introduction of a means of review of the DPP's decision, 88 and by moving away from the blanket abolition of the jury in relation to a select class of offences. This would ensure that the measure is neither unjust, arbitrary, nor unreasonable.
In addition to concerns about equality, it could be argued that the quality of decision-making in an adversarial system is jeopardised through judge-only courts. In particular, the use of a single judge in England, Wales and Northern Ireland raises concerns regarding the single judge's role as arbiter of both fact and law. In their study of Diplock trials in Northern Ireland, Jackson and Doran determined that the defendants suffered an 'adversarial deficit' on the basis that lay triers of fact can afford to take a more wide-ranging view of the merits of the prosecution case than an expert tribunal, and that a professional approach necessitates a certain case-hardening in the sense that it demands that a colder, unemotional attitude is taken towards the evidence. 94 This permits a broader range of intelligence and information to be divulged than would usually be permitted in a criminal trial.
Despite the 'unrealistic cerebral activity' 95 required by the trial court's position as arbiter of fact and law, of course magistrates do this on a regular basis and this is generally seen as acceptable. In addition, this concern may be mitigated by the fact that the court must provide a written judgment of the decisions, outlining the reasoning in relation to both aspects of its role, 96 in contrast to jury trials. 97 In DPP v
Gilligan the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal noted that if the trial had been heard before a jury rather than before the SCC, it, as the appellate court, would not have known how the jury reached its verdict or what witnesses it considered to be credible. 98 Moreover, although the court is not required to disqualify itself from a case where it has heard inadmissible evidence that is prejudicial to the accused it has the discretion to do so, and this would not be impracticable, given that the panel of judges for the SCC is sufficiently large to allow a reconstituted court to hear the case. 99 So, the provision of a written judgment and the possibility of a 
Alternatives to juryless trials
So, juryless trials raise issues in terms of equality and the quality of decision-making, though as noted these are not insurmountable. Due to these concerns and the absence of lay participation, one may conclude that juryless trials are never justified in the common law context, especially given the existence of alternative protective measures. These are now considered.
One feasible alternative to abolishing the jury is to limit the existing right to inspect the panel from which jurors are drawn. 100 The right to inspect is predicated on transparency, but affords considerable potential for intimidation; the names of jurors chosen could be matched with the initial panel list to find their addresses. 101 Indeed, in Northern Ireland the right to inspect has been abolished, and restrictions have been placed on the disclosure of juror information by court, electoral and police officers as well as by jurors themselves.
102 Surprisingly, given its potential as a safeguard, this development has not been mirrored in the rest of the United Kingdom or in Ireland.
Another approach would be to hold the trial without the jury present in court, but rather viewing the proceedings by closed-circuit television. 103 Similar schemes for witnesses have been approved by domestic and European courts, 104 and so this would not affect the fair trial of the defendant. Nevertheless, it is possible that the members of the jury would be influenced by the protective measures deemed to be necessary in such cases, and even with a judicial warning could construe this as implying guilt or at least dangerousness on the part of the accused. Thus, caution should be exercised regarding the adoption of such a measure.
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